Two scholars of the international relations of Eurasia consider the "geopolitical identity" of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They firstly outline that most of the existing analysis and comment on the SCO assumes its raison d'etre to be countering the "West" in Eurasia and beyond, and suggest that this narrow perspective does not afford the SCO enough agency, which leads to a distorted picture of the variety of SCO discourse and behavior.
Introduction
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been gaining increasing international visibility since its establishment in 2001. Its membership of Russia, China, and four post-Soviet Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), as well as Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observer states, has led it to be considered a significant actor within the wider Eurasian space. In spite of its membership and predominant focus on Eurasia, the majority of characterizations of the SCO -in both the existing literature and in the media -are that it is predominately defined by a desire to counter the West. While there is a growing literature on the SCO, little attention has been paid to the SCO's geopolitical discourse, or "geopolitical imagination" (Agnew, 2003) .
2 Hence, to a certain extent, the depiction of the SCO as counterpoised to the West is based on a one-sided reading of its relevance to the West's "geopolitical imagination". Further, this view is based on the assumptions of a traditional geopolitical perspective, which Agnew refers to as the "modern geopolitical imagination" (Agnew, 2003) , whereby "states are in an unremitting competition with one another for primacy" (Agnew, 2010a, p. 572) . Due to its membership, many commentators have deduced that it is logical that the SCO must be defined by a desire to challenge the West. In the last decade, China has been characterized as an "emerging superpower", whose rise is likely to alter the prevailing global balance-of-power. During the same period, Russia has expressed an ambition to be recognized as a "great power" (Neumann, 2008; Tsygankov, 2005; Adomeit, 1995) and is considered a state with a long history of competition with the West. Hence, it has be concluded that an organization containing these two actors must be driven by an agenda of undermining the prevailing hegemonic position of the US, and the West at large, within the international system.
To examine the SCO's various spatial and normative identity constructions, and the role that its perception of the "West" plays to this end, this article draws on the literatures of Self/Other identity relationships (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Prozorov, 2012; Epstein, 2011; Suzuki, 2007; Neumann, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Neumann, 1996) , critical geopolitics (Dalby, 2008; Paasi, 2006; Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail, and Agnew, 1992; Dalby, 1991) and the emerging literature on the interjection between regional studies in political geography 1 The term "Western" has come under increasing interrogation in recent years, particularly with regard to the discussion about the division between Western and non-Western IR. In this paper, however, the question of the West is approached from the point of view of the existing literature on the SCO that itself tends to labels this particular regional organisation as "anti-Western" as will be outlined in the review literature. Therefore the point of departure is to examine whether this is indeed the way in which the SCO itself constructs itself and its Others. For a greater discussion of the "West" as opposed to the "non-West" see: Acharya, 2011; Hutchings, 2011; Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Tickner and Waever, 2009; Bilgin, 2008; Tickner, 2003 . 2 Ambrosio (2009 has examined the norms and discourse articulated by the SCO in relation to democracy.
and contemporary geopolitics (Popescu, 2008; Prozorov, 2007; Glassman, 2005; Toal, 2003; Kaplan and Hakly, 2002) . It traces how the SCO's geopolitical discourse, or identity, on international/regional affairs is built upon a Self-Other dynamic with regard to the West. In this paper, Self/Other constructs are seen as composed of three broad types, the discourse on the Self from within, the Other as similar/different, and the Other as an opposite, while acknowledging that in practice these analytical divisions are blurred. It is argued that with regard to certain spaces and issues the SCO seeks to construct an in-group among its members by contrasting their common positions against those of the West. However, in others it seeks to build a larger in-group with the West.
This paper thus bears out the view that the West plays the role of an important counterpoint for the SCO and that it often defines itself against the West. However, this is the case only in some respects, and in some spaces. In other respects and spaces the West does not play such a role, and indeed is sometimes constructed as a similar, even collaborative, Other.
Therefore, it is suggested that a more nuanced understanding of the geopolitical identity of the SCO is required than that of the prevailing popular characterizations. To this end, the SCO should be allowed greater space and agency to define its own geopolitical identity instead of being considered only in relation to the West.
This article firstly surveys the current literature on the SCO, secondly it outlines its basic theoretical assumptions about identity and geopolitics, and thirdly, traces the SCO's geopolitical discourse on its own identity, and that of its relationship to the West in terms of both Eurasia and the wider international system.
The SCO and Its Geopolitical Discourses
Ever since its creation in 2001, the SCO has predominately been depicted as an anti-Western grouping, created in order to counter-balance the West's (and particularly the US) influence in Eurasia and as a Russian-Chinese driven anti-Western bloc in the wider global space (Ferguson, 2012; Naarajärvi, 2012; Carroll, 2011; Wilhelmsen and Flikke, 2011) . As outlined in the introduction, this perspective tends to be shaped by a traditional reading of "geopolitics", and the assumption that states inevitably compete for influence, status and control over resources vis-à-vis one another and in terms of their hierarchical position within the international system.
As Agnew notes " [f] rom this viewpoint, achieving high rates of economic growth will automatically translate into an urge for great power at others' expense and the anarchy of the world beyond state borders makes this task inevitable" (Agnew 2010a, p.572). With the Chinese "economic miracle" continuing apace, and Russia's openly outlining its desire for "great power" status, a lot of analysis of the SCO has taken this perspective. This is perhaps unsurprising given that one of founding fathers of "geopolitics" as a school of thought, Halford
Mackinder, made the case for such a perspective by arguing that the geographical area which is roughly proximate to that of the membership of the SCO, represents the "heartland" of world geopolitics and the "pivot" of world history (Mackinder, 1904) .
3
The existing literature varies in its depiction of the geopolitical orientation of the SCO as an actor, and the primacy, and nature, of its perceptions of and relationship to the West. Some analysts have viewed the SCO as nothing more than a vehicle to counter the "West", be that the de Haas, 2008; Gene, 2008) . Indeed, the propensity of the current literature to focus on the SCO as driven and defined by antiWesternism has been noted by several scholars. 6 The coverage of the SCO in the popular media has been even more explicit in depicting it as centered on countering the West.
7
Whilst, the image of the SCO as an aggressive anti-Western actor has softened somewhat in recent years, the remnants of these underlying assumptions about the SCO remain.
This is illustrated by accounts of the SCO's proclaimed focus on playing a larger role in Afghanistan as driven by an attempt to counter-balance NATO in Afghanistan (Fiacconi, 2012) , rather than as a bid to deal with a common regional security dilemma. Indeed, this tendency to consider the SCO as primarily an anti-Western bloc and not a multilateral framework focused on issues within its own region, is consistent with broader trends that linger in international relations literature and policy analysis. Such analysis tends to interpret non-Western actors' identity constructions and central foci as primarily framed through the binary of their 3 For an analysis of the framing of Central Asia in Western academia, including the role of Mackinder's "Eurasian Heartland" thesis in this, see Heathershaw and Mergoran, 2011; Sengupta, 2009; Heathershaw, 2007; Megoran, 2004 . 4 Cohen (2006 states that the "SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States". While a US Senator proclaimed that "SCO is "the most dangerous organisation Americans have never heard of " and ""a potential Warsaw Pact" (Brownback, 2006) . 5 Ambrosio outlines that the SCO "represents a formidable challenge to the ideas of universal democracy and human rights through its de facto legitimisation of authoritarianism and by establishing itself as a counterweight to external democratic norms" (Ambrosio, 2008 (Ambrosio, , p. 1322 . While, Bailes and Dunay (2007, p. 13) noted, "up to very recently, analytical writing about the SCO ….
[has] liked to stress how far away the Organisation actually is from European traditions and norms in its way of dismissing human rights concerns and forbidding mutual 'interference in internal affairs'". 6 Hanova argues that "Russian and Chinese interests in the SCO are often reduced to a common objective of anti-Americanism" (2009, p. 80) . Troitsky states the "Western assessments sometimes view the SCO as increasingly becoming a mechanism to oust the USA and its Western allies from Central Asia, and thus to threaten Western security interests" (Troitskii, 2007) . 7 A BBC (2012) report notes it is "widely viewed as a countermeasure to curb the influence of Western alliances, such as Nato"; Sky News 2008) outlined that "the alliance was established in 2001 to counter NATO influence in the Central Asian region"; Tony Halpin writing in The Times noted that it "increasingly regarded by Moscow and Beijing as a counterweight to US global influence".
relationship with the West, or in other words a "non-Western/Western" Self/Other dynamic (Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Hobson 2007; Barkawi and Laffey 2006) . This paper is focused on the SCO's discourse and attempts to construct geopolitical space, and to this end it treats the SCO's geopolitical discourse as a coherent discourse for analytical purposes. However, like all multilateral organizations, the SCO cannot claim to present a fully coherent and collective representation of its member-states geopolitical perspective and interests. Indeed, as with all collective groupings, the SCO is the subject of competing and divergence of voices among its membership. These areas of contention among the SCO members have centered on whether it should primarily focus on security or economics (see Aris, 2011, pp. 78-83; Bailes and Dunay, 2007, p. 16-17; Oldberg, 2007, p. 28) , the depth of integration (see Aris 2011, pp.175-7; Bailes and Dunay, 2007; Oldberg, 2007, p. 35; Troitskii 2007, p.34) , and the potential expansion of its membership and the long-term identity of the organization (see Aris 2011, pp.164-170; Bailes and Dunay, 2007, p. 19; Makhmudov, 2007; Portyakov, 2007) .
Also, the SCO faces a number of challenges. The effectiveness of the SCO as a model for multilateral cooperation has often by questioned due to some of the very concepts and principles it espouses as part of its geopolitical discourse, namely non-intervention in domestic affairs. This is exacerbated by the reluctance of some of the member states' regimes to participate in any form of cooperation, let alone integration, which may threaten their own sovereign control over all internal policy matters (Aris, 2011; Allison, 2008; Allison, 2004) . In addition, scholars have highlighted a degree of distrust between some of its members (Bond and Koch, 2010; Allison, 2004) . Against this background, the effectiveness of the SCO as a force for regional security management has been questioned by both Western (Bond and Kuch, 2010; McDermott, 2010; Melvin, 2010; Weitz, 2010) and regional analysts (Morozov, 2009; Portyakov, 2007; Zhao, 2006) . This is due to the SCO's focus on the principle of non-intervention and the lack of both its capacity and willingness to act as a collective multilateral actor. The SCO's model of regional cooperation, while strongly limited in terms of its effectiveness to act as an agent for regional security management, is to a large degree consistent with its discursive geopolitical vision about what should define the norms, values and standards of international relations.
Broadly speaking there is less contestation concerning the SCO's conception of geopolitics than in other areas of its agenda. The primary dividing line on geopolitical matters has been on the degree to which the SCO should represent itself as a counter-Western actor within the international system, with reservations expressed about such a focus among the more Western-orientated Central Asian Republics (Aris, 2011, pp. 146-8; Maksutov, 2006, p. 9) .
Notably, Kazakhstan is considered to be concerned that overt anti-Western rhetoric may impact on the increasingly investment in Kazakh energy resources by Western companies (Maksutov, 6 2006, 9; Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva, 2006) . 8 However, Moscow's and, especially, Beijing's 9 desire to keep the Central Asian member states engaged in the development of the SCO project has led both to refrain from pushing the other states into endorsing statements and positions that they strongly oppose, with the exception of the declaration on the RussianGeorgian War and during the Osh Riots (2010), both of which will be discussed below. 10 In this way, the reservation of some of members about overt anti-Western comment restricts the scope for such discourse within the SCO and provides a check on excessive anti-Western rhetoric.
Furthermore, all the members have at various times deemed the SCO to be a useful geopolitical tool in their own foreign policy. Thus, in spite of certain cases of divergences on particular incidents, there has been very little public disagreement with SCO geopolitical statements from its own membership and it has been able to put forward a relatively consistent and coherent geopolitical vision over the last decade.
Analytical Framework
To assess the SCO's geopolitical identity, and the significance of the West in this regard, this article adopts an interdisciplinary analytical framework, drawing on insights from both critical security studies and critical geopolitics scholars. 11 These are utilized to examine the identity Self/Other construction of the SCO and its production of geopolitical discourses and practices.
As outlined by Müller, "adopting a constructivist perspective, critical geopolitics examines the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities -the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning" (Müller, 2008, p.323) . How actors define their geopolitical identities, often in relation to what is understood as lying within the "internal" space and its differentiation to the "external" space, also defines how they view the nature of the wider geopolitical space and their role, place and hierarchical position within it. By extension, this colors how they view other actors and spaces, which are interpreted in relation to the said actor's reading of how they fit within the international system and in turn reflect their "national interests and identities" (Agnew, 2010a, p. 570) .
This tendency to view Others in the world through your own -Self -geopolitical imaginary and identity, often leads to misrepresentation of the perspective of the Other. Indeed, (Hobson, 2012; Agathangelou and Ling, 2009; Bilgin, 2008; Sidaway, 2008; Hobson, 2007; Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Robinson, 2003) .
For example, as noted by Agnew with reference to Western analysis of China, "it is foreign commentators who are especially prone to interpret China's geopolitical position exclusively in terms of Western conventional wisdom" (Agnew, 2010a, p. 572) . Taking this into account, this paper seeks to examine the SCO's discourse on geopolitics from this organization's perspective and discourses, rather than simply by imposing objective models or principles from outside.
Starting from this "critical geopolitics" perspective, this article draws on the synergies between the assumptions of "critical geopolitics" and "constructivist IR" approaches, in order to outline a framework for examining the Self-Other dynamic in the SCO's geopolitical discourse vis-à-vis the West. As Mamadouha and Dijkinka note "critical geopolitics relates more clearly to constructivist approaches in international relations (IR), studies focusing on the formation of international and security identities and strategic culture" (Mamadouha and Dijkinka, 2006, p. 355) . Post-positivist IR scholars assert that identity is the product of an actor's understanding of Self and Other, as well as the normative structures of the context in which it functions. 12 In other words, identity is constructed by an actor's perceptions of its own identity and that of the outside world, including Other actors. The notion of the Other is "an epistemological necessity in the definition of the self: the very capacity to experience a self is contingent upon otherness; it is in dialogue with others that the self is shaped" (Honneland, 1998, p. 281 ). An actor's perception of the Other(s) thus enables it to distinguish itself from Others, by identifying differences between other actors and itself, and also by constructing its relationships with these Others within its perceived context (Snetkov, 2010) .
However, as opposed to the conception of identity found in more poststructuralist literature (e.g. Mouffe, 2000; Campbell, 1998) , this article considers that the Self-Other dynamic is not inevitably formed around an antagonistic relationship between the Self and the Other. While, an actor constructs its identity in relation to what it perceives its Others to be, the nature and identity of this Other is not fixed. Thus, a variety of different constructions of the Other and its relationship to the Self are possible. As Hansen (2006, p. 38) argues "less-thanradical Others" are commonplace, and as noted by Hopf, "identities are always relational, but only sometimes oppositional" (Hopf, 2002, p. 7) .
Indeed, this article concurs with the scholars that argue that a range of possible constructions of the Other exist (Herschinger, 2012, p. 73; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Buzan and Waever, 2009, p. 262; Hansen, 2006; Campbell, 1998) : These include an oppositional and antagonistic Other, seen in direct contrast to the Self; an Other which is seen as different but not antagonistic to the Self; or an Other with which the Self sees similarity and with which it can construct a common in-group identity (Hansen, 2006) . Taking this into account, as suggested by Hansen, there is a need for an analytical framework that allows not only for the study of "a radically different and threatening Other", but which also accounts "for degrees of difference and Otherness" (2006, p. 38) .
Furthermore, and given the article's focus on a multilateral actor, the importance of collective identity formation that is not automatically centered on the process of Othering is asserted, particularly when analyzing processes of identity construction of regional organizations. Indeed, drawing on the work of Krasner (1999) , Abizadeh makes the distinction between two forms of sovereignty and self/other dynamics: sovereignty/control within a particular territorial space and sovereignty/control of external borders in relation to other actors in the international system. Whilst the latter does indeed delineate spatially between Us and Them, the former is centered on sovereignty/identity building drawn from within a particular space that does not per se need to be constructed on an explicit Self/Other dynamic (Abizadeh, 2005, pp. 49-50) .
This is an aspect of collective identity building that is now an accepted feature in the study of the EU and its identity building processes, 13 and is increasingly also being recognized with regard to the study of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) via the notion of the "ASEAN-way" (Acharya, 2001) . However, analysis of the SCO has continued to downplay this aspect of collective identity building within the SCO itself, and has instead, as noted above, emphasized its function as a counterbalance to the West. Against this background, this article argues that in contrast to a lot of existing analysis of "non-Western" regional organizations, it is necessary to recognize the agency of non-Western actors. Firstly, in terms of their capacity to construct their own view and position towards the Other. Secondly, in their ability to construct their collective identity according to local dynamics that are not directly constructed through their relationship with the West.
Finally, this article asserts that an actor does not have a single fixed identity, including in terms of a Self/Other dynamic. Rather, identity construction functions across a wide-range of spatial, temporal and issue contexts, and are not necessarily the same in all. In this respect, this paper rejects the more mainstream definition of identity (Wendt, 1992) as "essentially self-
sameness, or what makes an object unique" and "involves assumptions about stability over time -a self or object is assumed to have a stable, unchangeable essence or core" (Ortmann, 2008, p. 51) . Instead, identity constructions are on-going processes and in constant evolution, emphasizing "the fluidity and contextual nature of identities" (Abdelal et al, 2006, p. 697) .
Whereas, much of the current literature on geopolitical discourses and identity constructions focus on a single strand or dimension of the Self/Other dynamic, this perspective suggests that is necessary to take into account the variety of spatial discourses and positionalities that exist in different contexts and on different issues and aspects of relationships. As noted by Morozov and Rumelili "positive and negative representations of the Other can coexist and be projected upon different aspects of the Other's identity" (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012, p. 31 ) Therefore, multiple strands of identity constructions and processes of othering are possible within the same corpus of geopolitical discourse. Hence, we proceed from "an understanding of the degree to which all states ….. must necessarily adjust in practice to a world politics in constant evolution
and not just of their making" (Agnew, 2010a, p. 575).
Against this background, the question of whether or not the SCO is an anti-Western organization is not an easy one to answer, nor is it easy to characterize the nature of the Self/Other dynamic between the SCO and the West as based on a single identity construction. In practice, as outlined below, the answer varies depending on which particular strand of the SCO's geopolitical discourse one examines. Taking this into account, the next section surveys the SCO's geopolitical discourse with regard to its Self, and the West as its primary Other, across the full range of spatial and issue-areas in which this Self-Other dynamic is active. It has been argued that the basis for such an intra-regional focus has grown since the second half of the 2000s. Although the SCO's record of implementing its economic agenda is patchy, its member states have at least begun to realize the potential mutual economic benefits from a closer and more coordinated relationship (Aris 2011; Portyakov 2007; Chung 2006) . In this respect, an important dynamic has been the growth in Chinese, and to a much lesser extent Russian, investment in the Central Asian Republics. This Chinese investment is seen as driven by its need for greater energy resources (Pannell, 2011; Marketos, 2009b; Sheives, 2006) , while both Russia and China hope to establish their influence in the region in the face of growing competition from other external powers (Bailes and Dunay, 2007; Oldberg, 2007) . From the Central Asian leaderships' perspective, their states are, to varying extents, dependent on foreign 14 The main methods by which the SCO seeks to express its views on the international stage are by the issuing of statements with regard to international events, and more importantly the common declarations issued at the annual summit meetings of the Heads of State.
investments, and such investment is considered as valuable for stabilizing their states and thus the security of their regimes, as long as it does not threaten their sovereign control over their national economy (Aris, 2011; Allison, 2004 (Frolenkov, 2008; Oldberg, 2007; Troitskii, 2007) .
Hence, in recent years the emphasis on developing mutual economic interests and interdependence between the SCO member states has increased. For example, in relation to the burgeoning Chinese-Kazakhstan relationship on energy, which is seen as conditioned by a background of direct competition with the growing engagement of Western energy companies in Kazakhstan during recent years, 15 Pannell notes that from a Chinese perspective this represents "a strategic as well as practical response to this growing demand and necessity for China's rapidly growing economy. It also serves to further intensify China's economic ties to Kazakhstan in such a way that creates mutual benefits but also some increased dependency" (Pannell, 2011, p. 111) . Although, economic cooperation is mainly limited to energy and largescale infrastructural projects 16 and predominately restricted in implementation by concerns over maintaining economic sovereignty 17 , it has nonetheless contributed to a Eurasian context which is, to at least some extent, more conducive to the development of intra-regional identity within the SCO.
As well as highlighting that it is focused on intra-regional matters, the SCO does express the aim of becoming a voice in wider international affairs. The 2006 SCO summit declaration outlines that the "SCO member states will continue to strengthen coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs and take a common position on matters involving SCO's According to a number of scholars, a shift in the approach to the "three evils" is evident between the early period after the formation of the SCO, in which it was primarily centered on countering the threat of extremist, separatist and opposition groups conducting terrorist operations, and the second half of the 2000s onwards, since when this remit has been expanded to include any dynamic seen as agitating against the existing regimes due to the experience of the "color revolutions" (Allison, 2008; Ambrosio, 2008; Lanteigne, 2006/7) . The focus placed on addressing challenges within the region is often related to ensuring that this concentration on the Self is not undermined by the actions of extra-regional actors within Eurasia. This is reflected in its discourse on international affairs, which both seeks to signal that it is driven by a focus on its own region, but also that it considers interference by external actors within its own region as a geopolitical challenge; in particular the propensity of Western states to interfere in the domestic affairs of non-Western states. This approach is, however, not presented as automatically anti-Western. Indeed, as noted by the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexei Borodavkin, SCO does not operate to spite or suit someone. It advocates reinforcing security and stability, developing many-sided partnerships for the good of the peoples of our countries 18 The city of Osh experienced large-scale violent rioting and looting between 11 and 14 June 2011. The violence is said to have occurred along multiple dividing lines: ethnic, in particular in the form of ethnic Kyrgyz attacking ethnic Uzbeks; political, with groups loyal to the ousted President Bakiyev and opposed to the interim government seeking to create chaos ahead of a nationwide referendum on a new constitution; criminal, organised criminal groups sought to capitalise on the ensuing chaos for their own purposes. The resultant violence cost many lives and led to widespread destruction of homes, businesses and infrastructure in and around the city, which highlighted that the interim government was not in control of events.
and forming an institutional architecture of international relations based on mutual respect, due consideration for the interests of each other, and equal cooperation (Borodavkin, 2008) .
The principle of "local" norms taking primacy in regional affairs in order to restrict global dynamics entering the region was also present in the SCO's response to the global financial crisis in 2008/9. The need to strengthen financial and economic mechanisms of regional cooperation has been outlined annually during the SCO Summits since 2009. As noted by the Chinese President Hu Jintao in June 2012 "[w]e should build the SCO into a driving force to boost regional economic development" (Xinhuanet, 2012) . The subsequent proposals for the "establishment of a development bank, food security cooperation mechanism, energy club and seed banks, and for the promotion of trade and investment facilitation" (Xinhuanet, 2012) were intended to support regional actors in mediating global trends seen as negatively impacting on the region. At the same time, the SCO has sought to highlight that it considers wider international cooperation on this issue as imperative, 19 as well as maintaining a specific regional approach aimed at shielding the region from adverse trends beyond it.
Similarly, discussions over the role of the SCO in Afghanistan, following the US and ISAF-planned withdrawal by 2014, reflect this focus on regional identity construction and policy-making, rather than anti-NATO and anti-Western posturing and balancing. The SCO has suggested that Afghanistan should be addressed within a regional orbit, and that the SCO as a regionally-focused actor should play a role to this end. As noted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Weimin, Afghanistan borders others SCO members. The country's development will be closely linked to security and stability in the region. The fact that Afghanistan has become an observer member of the SCO will speed up security and cooperation (CNTV, 2012) .
In 2009, the SCO hosted a conference on Afghanistan and in 2012 granted Afghanistan observer status within the organization. This further indicates that the issue of Afghanistan and the SCO's response to it should be read primarily as part of the SCO's regional remit, rather than as an attempt to build an anti-Western in-group.
Hence, elements of the SCO's geopolitical discourse emphasize that its central focus is on its Self, and specifically addressing the manifest security challenges within the Eurasian region, rather than countering West. However, the West is often framed within this discourse as an indirect Other, threatening to undermine the capacity of the SCO to focus on its Self, by interfering in Eurasia and restricting its capacity to develop regional norms and practices in response to regional challenges.
Making sense of the Other: the West's role in world and the protection of the regional from the global
In connection with the strands that promote itself as a self-referential regional actor, a key feature of the SCO's geopolitical discourse is the significance of local norms and the need to recognize and accept that the international system is made up of different normative contexts.
In accordance with its promotion of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and a multipolar world, the SCO advocates a greater place for regional diversity of norms within the international system. It is argued that in Eurasia, it should be the SCO member states setting the norms of behavior as the actors with the most knowledge, experience and resources to do so. In this way, the 2011 Astana summit declaration notes that by taking a "path towards deepening good-neighborly, friendly and partner relations in the region" with the formation of SCO. Hence, it has "set a good example for the international community in the cause of achieving pragmatic and important result in the field of common development" (Astana Declaration of the 10th
Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2011).
Within this recognition that multiple norms exist in the international system, the member states of the SCO consider that certain particular norms and values should form the basis of international relations. Whilst certain declarations and statements issued by the SCO contain criticism of the behavior of the West, and US in particular, these are also usually framed according to the commonly perceived normative standpoint developed within the SCO in-group.
The common values and norms which underpin the SCO are termed the "Shanghai spirit", which puts the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs at the heart of the SCO. In connection with its emphasis on protecting the region from outside interference, the SCO champions the principles underlying the "Shanghai spirit" at an international level. Thus it advocates the centrality of "Westphalian" principles -as opposed to the post-Westphalian -of international relations that places state sovereignty and territorial integrity as the cornerstones of the international system. The perceived need to assert this perspective strongly, especially with regard to Western actions in Eurasia, grew after the period of the "color revolutions" in the mid-2000s, which were interpreted by the leaderships of the SCO members as a threat to their regimes and regional 20 The SCO Summit declaration (2006) stated that the "SCO owes its smooth growth to its consistent adherence to the "Shanghai Spirit" of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations and pursuit of common development". This spirit is the underlying philosophy and the most important code of conduct of SCO. It enriches the theory and practice of contemporary international relations and embodies the shared aspiration of the international community for realizing democracy in international relations. The "Shanghai Spirit" is therefore of critical importance to the international community's pursuit of a new and non-confrontational model of international relations, a model that calls for discarding the Cold War mentality and transcending ideological differences".
stability (Aris, 2011; Wilson, 2010; Allison, 2008; Ambrosio, 2008) . This attitude was hardened by the widespread perception within Eurasia that Western actors, and specifically US government-supported NGOs, actively worked to provoke these "color revolutions" (Ortmann and Heathershaw, 2012; Wilson, 2010) . as the attempts by the West to universalize their own values and sense of Self. This is often contrasted with the SCO's discourse that emphasizes the importance of the diversity of identity and values in the international system, and the right to protect this regional identity and its prevailing norms and practices from outside interference.
Making sense of the Other: the West's role in Eurasia
In accordance with the SCO's geopolitical stance on wider international affairs, the perceived role of the West in the SCO's own region has caused considerable tension and had a negative impact on the way in which the SCO perceives its relationship with the West. In connection with its activities within Eurasia, the SCO presents the West largely as an antagonistic Other, and as an agent advocating norms and practice that undermine the common positions and views established among the SCO in-group.
A key issue is the view that the West does not take into account the prevailing security or political context within Eurasia. In this respect, a Chinese official states that "certain Western countries, without taking into account concrete specific features of Central Asian states, consider 'democratic transformations' to be the main aim of their relations with the region, and even encourage 'color revolutions' in an attempt to broaden their political and military influence, which leads to greater instability in the region'" (Cited in Portyakov, 2008, p.162) .
The leaderships of the SCO's member states consider that within the existing Westerninspired normative landscape there is no room for recognition of regional identity and values.
Instead, the Western inspired model of liberal-democracy is pushed upon them regardless of circumstances. The former Secretary-General of the SCO highlighted this viewpoint, stating that, democracy is a good thing, but its exercise in practice depends on the concrete situation on the ground in each region and each country. It is unacceptable to apply absolutely the same approach everywhere and inadmissible to transplant democracy by force, thus bestowing a doubtful benefit upon someone .
Against this background, the member states' regimes consider the SCO as an important supporter of their domestic security policies, which attract criticism in the West. In this way, not only is the West presented as a negative Other, but the Self is presented as a necessary ingroup in order to protect the domestic interests of its member-states. The principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs underpins the faith of its member states that the SCO as an ingroup is a reliable mechanism in defense of their regimes. Ambrosio (2009, p. 174) argues that "a key component of the [SCO] defense of diversity is the argument that it is illegitimate for outsiders to 'impose' their version of democracy on anyone else". On this basis, the SCO is recognized as a mechanism for creating a preferable normative environment, in which the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs remains paramount. Thus, the SCO attempts to promote its intra-organizational norms and perceptions in its geopolitical discourse, with the aim of ensuring sufficient space for the Central Asian Republics to pursue their domestic security policies without the prospect of Western intervention and condemnation (Allison, 2008, pp. 186-8) .
In this respect, the events of the "color revolutions" and Western reaction to the Andijan though this appeared to be in contradiction with the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (Swanstrom, 2008) . Hence, the other members of the SCO were faced with a difficult situation, whereby they were being asked to undermine the primary principle of the organization because "one of its members' exercised the same 'double standards', for which it criticizes the West" (Aris, 2011, p. 145) . In a rather pragmatic response, the SCO sought to sweep this issue under the carpet by not issuing a statement of support, but outlining in its 2008 Summit declaration that it acknowledged Russia's key role in maintaining peace in this region. The statement also reaffirmed its commitment to its non-interference doctrine. In addition, no other SCO member followed Russia in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states.
The SCO has sought to reassert the centrality of "non-interference" within the SCO's geopolitical identity in the wake of the Russian-Georgia war, and indeed the legacy of this challenge to its geopolitical credibility was to some degree evident when these principles were articulated again during the Osh riots in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (Aris, 2011 . However, in all likelihood, the decision not to intervene in Kyrgyzstan was the product of a variety of geopolitical considerations not directly associated to the principle of non-
interference. An important factor was Russia's concern "about the true allegiances of the interim government once its power is consolidated" (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 551) . As was Tashkent's reluctance to play a role in bringing security to Osh in spite of its proximity to the Uzbek border and the suffering of the ethnic Uzbek minority in Osh, because "Uzbekistan's elite-level wariness of the Uzbek diaspora, as evidenced by the general reluctance to accept refugees and efforts to close the border as quickly as possible" (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 555) . Indeed, it has been argued that "the events [the Osh riots in June 2010] have in fact exposed significant divisions among member states" (Bond and Koch, 2010, p. 553) and illustrated that the SCO has "no capacity for rapid reaction to such events, and the individual responses of its member states would suggest it is unable to call upon the political will of its members to form a common force" (Aris, 2012, p.471) .
Nonetheless, in line with its wider geopolitical narrative, as illustrated by the statement above, the SCO sought to frame its non-intervention in Osh as due to its well-stated position of non-interference in domestic affairs. The placing of the principle of non-interference at the heart of the SCO's geopolitical identity in itself applies certain limitations on its ability to serve as an effective regional security actor, at least in terms of responding to security crises. This is because "the 'non-intervention' principle that is used to define the SCO, and the position and role it plays as a security guarantor for state and regime security, make the normative landscape to intervene in domestic affairs very limited" (Aris, 2012, p.471) . Thus, the SCO's emphasis on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs as the cornerstone of its geopolitical identity seems to be driven by its members' leaderships' fear of active intervention by external actors in their domestic affairs. As well as a reaction against international condemnation and punishment for their domestic policies aimed at regime security.
The SCO's geopolitical discourse with regard to Eurasia constructs the West as an antagonistic Other. This depiction is informed by the SCO's negative reading of the West's role in global affairs. The West is considered to be an actor that seeks to universalize its own norms and undermine and breech what the SCO sees as crucial principles of sovereignty, noninterference in local (domestic or regional) affairs. As a consequence, it is also said to challenge the importance of local/regional contexts in regional and international governance. However, while at times, this is constructed as different interpretations of the principles of sovereignty and intervention in the international system, as soon as this touches on a regional issue, or a SCO member, then the West becomes a direct antagonistic Other, read as a threat to the Westphalian basis of its member states.
Potential avenues for cooperation with the West
Within its official geopolitical discourse, the SCO argues that the world is becoming However, this geopolitical discourse is not one based on a simplistic identification of similarity and commonality with the West. The SCO's approach to tackling the "three evils"
simultaneously likened itself to and distinguishes itself from the global "War on Terror". It focuses on the one hand on "coordinating their actions with the US in combating international terrorism". While, at the same time continuing to "act according to their own programs and in their own interests, closely linking this struggle with counteraction to separatism and Islamic extremism" (Lukin, 2007, p.142) . Nonetheless, its discourse on this issue signaled an effort by the SCO to define its identity as similar to, and in coordination with the West
Aside from the discourse on the war on terror, the issue of Afghanistan and wider re- States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime, 2012). The SCO is particularly interested in collaboration on counternarcotics programs and operations as this is considered a major security challenge to several of its member states. However, the lack of reciprocation from NATO, which deems this issue as of a lower priority, has caused frustration among its members.
Furthermore, as it becomes more focused on an outward geopolitical role within international affairs, the SCO's geopolitical discourse is increasingly moving beyond a Self-Other dynamic based on the West, and towards a focus on other actors within international relations.
As part of the SCO's geopolitical discourse that asserts that the international system is increasingly multipolar and interdependent, the SCO has highlighted the need for it to build up a broader coalition or in-group with other global and regional players. This has manifested itself in establishing diplomatic connections and partnerships with other multilateral institutions and structures, as seen in the signing of the cooperation agreement between the SCO and the UN in This approach is akin to the concept of network diplomacy, and is centered on a greater flexibility and pragmatism than is allowed for in traditional fixed forms of geopolitical coalitions and in which the Self-Other dynamic is highly malleable. These partnerships and networks have become an increasingly key part of the SCO's geopolitical discourse, lessening the significance of its relationship with the West for defining its spatial and normative identity within the international system. As this process develops, it is likely that the centrality of the West to the SCO's geopolitical identity constructions will in fact decline further. This perhaps reflects a wider geopolitical reorientation of space and identities within the international system, in which viewing all aspects of geopolitics through the perspective of the West, as the hegemonic centerpoint, becomes outmoded, or at least not the only relevant vantage point.
In spite of tensions over the norms that shape and drive contemporary international relations, and criticism of what it envisions as the West's antagonistic interference in Eurasia, the SCO's geopolitical discourse has also identified some areas of common interest and grounds for collaboration between the Self and the Other. This includes the potential for the creation of an ad-hoc temporary macro in-group with the West, on certain issues area and certain spaces.
In addition, the SCO is actively seeking to develop relationships with a range of other nonWestern actors, and these alternative Self-Other dynamics are increasingly becoming more important to the SCO. In this way, its definition of itself in relation to the West will become a less significant factor, and will open space for it to develop a wider range of geopolitical space for its relationship with other actors, and in its constructions of its own "geopolitical imaginary".
Conclusion
As the tracing of its geopolitical discourse has demonstrated, the SCO's identity is not constructed on the basis of a single identity and discourse between the Self (the SCO) and the Other (the West). While acknowledging that the SCO is far from a coherent amalgamation of its member states' views on the world and faces a number of practical challenges in enacting its rhetoric, this article has argued that the SCO's geopolitical discourse and constructs of its Self/Other relations are composed of three broad types: the discourse on the Self from within (collective identity); the Other as similar/different; and the Other as an opposite.
From this perspective, it is asserted that contrary to many depictions of the SCO as centered on a binary identity construction of countering the West, multi-faceted and fluid identity constructions are evident within the SCO's geopolitical discourses. The nature of the Self-Other dynamic vis-à-vis the West varies across spatial, issue and temporal contexts. Thus, on many issues and within many spaces, the SCO's geopolitical discourse on both international and regional affairs is indeed built upon a Self-Other dynamic that contrasts their common positions on certain international issues against those of the West. The most antagonistic interpretation of the West as an Other emerges in contexts in which the West is seen as directly challenging the collective identity of the SCO as an in-group, in terms of interference in the Eurasian space towards the end of influencing, or altering, internal affairs. A slightly more benign depiction of the West as a different Other can be found on issues within the global space that do not directly touch on the SCO's identity as an in-group, in particular on issues that most obviously point to a degree of common interest such as in the case of counter narcotics programs in Afghanistan.
However, on other issues in other contexts, the SCO's geopolitical discourse notes similarity to the West and is aimed at building a larger in-group between itself and the West, primarily with regard to international terrorism and the future stability of Afghanistan. On this basis, it is suggested that the SCO's geopolitical discourse on international/regional affairs functions to construct its identity as a limited in-group, which both rejects and seeks to work together with their perceived significant Other (the West).
Within this geopolitical imaginary, the SCO seeks to close, or limit, the space available to the West within what it considers its own regional jurisdiction and at the same time assert its ownership, and identity in terms, of the Eurasian space. Beyond the immediate Eurasian space, the SCO also seeks to close space to the West and open space for itself on certain issues of global norms and standards, but on other issues also seeks to open space for the West, and specifically for collaboration with the West, most notably over Afghanistan and the War on
Terror.
As highlighted in the analytical framework section, there is a tendency to dismiss collective identity building in most non-Western regional organizations that is not based on juxtaposition to the West, as part of the Western-centric focus on a "traditional" geopolitical perspective. However, as argued above, collective identity building processes centered on regional concerns and considerations form a central part of the SCO's geopolitical discourse and identity building narratives. Therefore, the SCOs collective identity building and geopolitical discourses cannot be reduced to its relationship with an Other (i.e. the West).
